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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

TORTS-WRONGFUL DEATH--"HOW MUCH IS A GOOD WIFE WORTH?"
' I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past twenty or thirty years, the size of judgments in personal injury
and wrongful death cases, has increased substantially. Unfortunately, wrongful
death cases involving wives and mothers have not kept pace with this trend.
Until recently, defense attorneys and claims office representatives have placed
such cases in the relatively low $10,000 to $20,000 range, even in those states
having liberal or no statutory limitations on recovery.1 One of the principal reasons for this is the failure of courts and attorneys to recognize the various elements
of harm for which damages may be recoverable. Even if each element is isolated,
there is typically a lack of adequate proof, often hampered by unwarranted
judicial restrictions on the type and manner of proof. Without specific proof
covering the manifestations of the loss, damages for the death of a wife have
been regarded as merely speculative.
This comment is designed to call attention to developments which will allow
expanded recoveries for the death of a wife, and to note some changes which can
be expected in the future.
II.

WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES-GENERALLY

At common law there could be no recovery for the death of a human being
killed by the negligence or wrongful act of another. 2 Now all states have statutes
or judicial decisions permitting recovery for wrongful death. The scheme most
commonly followed is that first used by Lord Campbell's Act.3 While there is a
wide variance as to who may sue, for whose benefit the action is brought and
the measure, elements and distribution of damages, statutes of this type designate
certain beneficiaries, usually the spouse, children, parents, executor or administrator, who are authorized to bring suit. Although such statutes often contain a
statement authorizing suit only where the party killed would have been able to
sue had death not ensued, it must be made clear that the suit is for the injuries
to the beneficiary and not to the deceased.

1. Horton v. State, 50 Misc.2d 1017, 1024. 272 N.Y.S.2d 312, 320 (1966):
"For many years our courts and juries have placed what seems in retrospect to
be a small or minimum value on the damages sustained to the next of kin on the
death of a housewife and mother. It has only been in the last two decades that
our courts have come to recognize the true value of a housewife and the services she
performs." See also SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 568 (1966); Glaser,
Evaluating and Proving the Losr of Services of a Housewife, in LEGAL ESSAYS OF
THE PLAINTIFF'S ADvoCATE 249 (Klonsky ed. 1961); Lambert, How Much is a
Good Wife Worth?, 41 B.U.L. REV. 328 (1961), reprinted in DAMAGES IN PERSONAL
INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH CASES 424 (Schreiber ed. 1965); Lambert, How
Much is a Good Wife Worth?, 26 NACCA L. J. 45 (1960); 13 AM. JUR. PROOF
OF FACTS 193 (1963).
2. Baker v. Boulton, 1 Campb. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).

3. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846).
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The Missouri statute is similar to Lord Campbell's Act. Although still retaining the same basic theory, the statute was substantially changed in 1967. 4
The maximum amount recoverable was increased to $50,000 and the spouse and
minor children were given equal standing to sue. If the spouse or children sue
separately, the suit is deemed to be for the benefit of the spouse and all the
children, but the total damages recoverable by them may not exceed $50,000.
The jury does not specify the amounts to be received by each, but only determines the total amount. The judge "shall then enter a judgment as to such
damages, apportioning them among those persons entitled .thereto as determined
by the court." 5 This language departs from the scheme of Lord Campbell's Act
which permitted the jury to apportion the damages.
III.

DAMAGES

FOR THE DEATH OF A HOUSEWIFE

A. In General-Pecuniary Loss Ride
Lord Campbell's Act and most statutes following it are based on the theory
that when someone is killed their family suffers a loss which can be compensated,
at least to some extent, in money. Either through express statutory language
or by judicial construction of general language, most states with this type of
statute have stated that this loss will be limited to the 'pecuniary loss" suffered
by the surviving beneficiaries. 6 As will be seen, however, many states have construed this term so broadly that it may now be questioned, although lip service
is still given to the rule. Missouri's statute has always contained the following
standard: "the necessary injury resulting from the death." 7 On many occasions this
language has been construed to express the pecuniary loss rule,8 although as will
be seen, Missouri has departed from the rule somewhat. Missouri has also allowed
additional damages amounting to a penalty so long as the total does not exceed
the statutory maximum. 9
4. §§ 537.080-.100, RSMo 1967 Supp.
5. § 537.095, RSMo 1967 Supp.
6. E.g. Burke v. City and County of San Francisco, 111 Cal. App.2d 314,
244 P.2d 708 (1952); Horton v. State, 50 Misc.2d 1017, 272 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1960);
Sutfin v. Burton, 91 Ohio App. 177, 104 N.E.2d 53 (1951); Prauss v. Adamski,
195 Or. 1, 244 P.2d 598 (1952); Spangler v. Helm's New York-Pittsburgh Motor
Express, 396 Pa. 302, 153 A.2d 490 (1959); Kramer v. Portland-Seattle Auto
Freight, 43 Wash.2d 386, 261 P.2d 692 (1953).
7. § 537.090, RSMo 1967 Supp.
8. E.g. Caen v. Feld, 371 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. 1963); Oliver v. Morgan, 73
S.W.2d 993 (Mo. 1934); Miller v. Kansas City Ry., 233 S.W. 1066 (Mo. 1921);
Szofran v. Century Elec. Co., 255 S.W.2d 443 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953).
9. Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 396 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1965); Contestible
v. Brookshire, 355 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. 1962); La Bella v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 224 Mo. App. 708, 24 S.W.2d 1072 (K.C. Ct. App. 1930). This is explained by:
"There is no recovery in a death case for punitive damages, as such. Such a petition may plead, and appropriate instructions may submit, the question of 'mitigating or aggravating circumstances' if the evidence justifies it . . . . While added
damages because of 'aggravating circumstances' may, in a sense, be considered
punitive in nature, they are not to be submitted as such nor are they to be submitted separately; nor is any total verdict and judgment to exceed the statutory limit."
Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., supra at 616.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/8
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Although the courts have used many definitions, most, such as the following,
are very brogd.,
The word "pecuniary,"' as used in death statutes, has been said not
to be used in a sense of the immediate loss of money or property, bdt to
look to the prospective advantages of a pecuniary nature that have been
cut off by the premature death of the person from whom they would
have come. Although the term "pecuniary loss" has been defined as a loss of
Money or something by which money or something of money value may
be acquired, loss of wages earned by the deceased for the support of his
family, is not the only matter to be considered in determining the
family's pecuniary loss .... The pecuniary loss is said to consist not-only
of the loss of financial assistance that the beneficiaries might reasonably
have expected, but also the loss of the mother's care and attention to the
physical, moral and educational welfare of her children, and a husband's
loss of services in the household. 10
Under thi s broad definition, if the decedent were the husband or father, the
primary measure of damages would be the loss of his financial assistance. When
it is the wife that is killed, the damages are composed of several, but less obvious
factors.
B. Employment Outside the Home
If the wife has worked outside the home there is little question that the loss
1
of this income is recoverable to the extent the family was benefited thereby.'
Even with a'large number of wives now working, it will be the unusual case where
this loss is 'a major element of damages. If employment were to continue for the
full coure of her life this loss could be substantial, but wives often do not continue to work for very many years.
C. Services in the Home
1. Meaning of "Services"
Currently the loss of services in the home will constitute the major portion
of any recovery for the death of a housewife. Even if a wife works outside the
home, it is very likely that she does all or a major part of the work necessary to
maintain the home and raise the children. Occasionally the estate of the wife
may try and recover the value of lost services but this has not been permitted.
of the wife
It is settled that, under the pecuniary loss type statute, the services
12
therefor.
recover
to
entitled
is
alone
he
belong to the husband and
10. 22 AM. Jun. 2d Deathi § 123 (1965).
11. Burke v. City and County of San Francisco, 111 Cal. App.2d 314, 244
P.2d 708 (1952); Combs v. Combs, 284 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. 1955); Horton v. State,
50 Misc.2d 1017, 272 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1966); Union Transports v. Braun, 318 S.W.2d
927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Texas & N. 0. Ry. v. Landrum, 264 S.W.2d 530 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954).
12. E.g. Baldwin v. Kansas City Ry., 231 S.W. 280 (K.C. Mo. App. 1921);
Martin v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry., 227 S.W. 129 (St. L. Mo. App. 1921), rev'd on other
grounds, 289 Mo. 479, 233 S.W. 219 (1921); Snickles v. City of St. Joseph, 155
Mo. App. 308, 136 S.W. 752 (1911). See also 16 AM. JuR. Death § 197' (1938);
27 AM. JUR. Husband and Wife § 497 (1940).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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'"Seivices" is a broad term consisting of maiy elements. To realize its breadth,
a careful consideration of all the activities of the wife in the home musi be made.
Several writers in this area have made attempts to catalogue these "various activities. One such writer states:
Investigation into the past family life will usually disclose 'that'the
decedent did all the marketing, the housecleaning, the decorating and redecorating, the wardrobe planning and buying for the children, the
mending, washing and ironing, the planning and management of educational trips to the museum, the zoo and points of historical interest, the
arrangements for birthday parties and holiday celebrations, the supervision
of schooling and homework, the nursing during illness, the moral training,
and the direction of religious training, and often much of the gardening.13
Many more items could be added to the list, in fact "there is probably no limit
to the type of service for which value may be recovered, and the ingenuity of trial
counsel can be given full rein."' 4
While the list of what "a housewife" iight do could be endless, a major
part of any"suit for the death of a wife will be to show what "the housewife" in the
particular case did in fact do. Among other things, testimony should show that
the "housewife did all (or a certain percentage) of the housework, devoting a
definite number of hours each week to cooking, sewing, housecleaning and so on;
that she was an energetic, industrious and dependable worker devoted to homemaking; and that the size of the family, the type and size of the dwelling they
occupied, and the ages and needs of the children and of the surviving husband
necessitate, the replacement of those services lost to the family because of the
housewife's death."' 5 Personal characteristics, including health, age, race, economic
background and the education of the deceased wife are also important. As will
be seen later, this background can have a considerable effect on the ultimate
recovery.
Much of the needed information will be available from the husband and
16
children, but substantiation by friends, relatives and neighbors may be helpful.
13. Spangenberg, Proof of Damages for Wrongful Death, in WRONGFUL DEATH
72 (Beall ed. 1958). See also Lambert (Schreiber ed.), op. cit.
supra note 1, at 463; Jan. 1959, THE AMERICAN HOME 34; Kierr, Proof of Damages Arising From the Death of a Housewife, 8 'LA. B.J. 215, 218 (1961).
14. SPEISER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 198. See also 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS
701, 855 (1965): "A computation in establishing the money value of a woman's
life stems from the virtually infinite number of combinations of homemaking activities and outside employment that are possible to a woman over her life
span."
15. SPEISER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 281. See also 31 AM. JuR.2d Expert and
Opinion Evidence § 144 (1967).
16. 11 AM. JUR. TRIALs 1 (1966). For cases illustrative of this method of
proof see: Fabrizi v. Griffin, 162 F. Supp. 276 (W.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 261 F.2d
594 (3d Cir. 1958); Burke v. City and County of San Francisco, 111 Cal. App.2d
314, 244 P.2d 708 (1952); Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461, 45- A.2d 789
(1946); Handorf v. Currie, 251 Iowa 896, 101 N.W.2d 836 (1960); Gulf Transport
Co. v. Allen, 209 Miss. 206, 46 So.2d 436 (1950); Combs v. Combs, 284 S.W.2d
423 (Mo. 1955); Hartzler v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 140 Mo. App. 665, 126 S.W.
AND SuRvrvORSHip
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Not only must the individual characteristics of the wife be shown, but any other
factors' which' make her services unique or more valuable should be included. This
is shown by Connie's Prescription Shop v. McCann,'7 where the mother was a

registered nurse and spent some time every day treating her daughter's skin
allergy which would continue for an indefinite number of years. A similar case is
Continental Bus Lines v. Toombs,18 in which the son was an asthmatic and

required additional care.
2. Proof of Value of Services
a. By Presumption
The simplest, although perhaps not always the best, method will be to present
no proof of the value of the services of the wife. Proof, in such a case, would be
limited to what services were actually performed.
If this method is adopted, the courts are split. The majority rule is stated:
Although it is true that where the damages to a husband through the
death of his wife are based upon the value of her services to him, and
it is incumbent on him to prove such services and their value, the plaintiff
may be aided in meeting the burden by a presumption. This presumption
is based upon the view that where the beneficiaries named in a wrongful
death statute have a legal relationship to the deceased by blood or marriage, it is presumed that they would have been pecuniarily benefited by
his or her continuance of life. 19
The majority rule is based on the idea that the value of such services is within
the common knowledge of the jury and therefore no other evidence need be
presented. 20 In Allendorf v. Elgin, I. & E. Ry.,2 1 an Illinois FELA case, the
court said:

760 (KC. Ct. App. 1910); Horton v. State, 50 Misc.2d 1017, 272 N.Y.S.2d 312
(1966); Sutfin v. Burton, 91 Ohio App. 177, 104 N.E.2d 53 (1951); Prauss v.
Adamski, 195 Or. 1, 244 P.2d 598 (1952); Spangler v. Helm's New York-Pittsburgh
Motor Express, 396 Pa. 482, 153 A.2d 490 (1959).
17. 316 P.2d 823 (Okla. 1957).
18. 325 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
19.

SPEISER,

op. cit. supra note 1, at 310.

20. Thomas v. S. H. Pawley Lumber Co., 303 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1962);
O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1959); Burke v. City and
County of San Francisco, 111 Cal. App.2d 314, 244 P.2d 708 (1952); Pollard v.
Kent, 59 Ga. App. 118, 200 S.E. 542 (1938); Blue's Truck Line v. Harwell,
57 Ga. App. 136, 194 S.E. 399 (1937), rev'd on other grounds, 187 Ga. 78, 199
S.E. 739 (1938); Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 8 Ill.2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288
(1956); Dobson v. Richter, 34 Ill. App.2d 22, 180 N.E.2d 505 (1962); Gulf
Transport Co. v. Allen, 209 Miss. 206, 46 So.2d 436 (1950); Moses v. Mathews,
95 Neb. 672, 146 N.W. 920 (1914); Carter v. West Jersey & S. Ry., 76 N.J.L.
602, 71 A. 253 (1908); Dahl v. North Am. Creameries, 61 N.W.2d 916 (N.D. 1953);
Connie's Prescription Shop v. McCann, 316 P.2d 823 (Okla. 1957); Prauss v.
Adamski, 195 Or. 1, 244 P.2d 598 (1952); Delaware, L. & W. Ry. v. Jones, 128
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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We are of the opinion that it is unnecessary to undertake to prove the
value of the financial loss of such care, etc. any more than it would be
necessary to prove the value of pain and -suffering or of inconvenience and
annoyance when they are elements of damage. The jury should assess the
value of such loss in the exercise of their best judgment based on, the
22
facts of each case.
These cases do not indicate, however, that other types of evidence will be excluded; merely that a presumption will be raised which will be adequate to take
the case to the jury without further proof. Unless very detailed evidence is presented as to what services were performed, this approach could result in a lower
judgment. In Wente v. Shaver,23 Missouri adopted the majority rule:
The fact of pecuniary benefit does not require definite and exact proof in
actions for wrongful death under the statute, but whenever there is a reasonable probability of pecuniary benefit to one from continuing life of
extinguishment of that life raises
another, however arising, the untimely
24
a presumption of pecuniary injury.
Not all cases accept this view. In Nelson v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 2 5 the
Michigan Supreme Court specifically required some evidence of value to be
presented on the theory that the jury needed a standard to follow and if none
was placed before them, they might compensate for loss of companionship,
wounded feelings or suffering, either of the deceased or of the beneficiary, which
would not be permissible under the pecuniary loss standard. No Michigan case has
specifically overruled this case, but language can be foitnd in later cases to the
26
effect that a case may go to the jury without such specific proof.
The presumption may be particularly useful where there is a very low maximum recovery under the statute or where it is apparent that the recovery is
likely to be small because of other factors such as the age of the decedent. If, for
example, a wife of twenty-five, with three children, were killed in a state having
a maximum of $10,000, it is doubtful that an expert would be of much aid in
increasing the amount of the verdict since it is likely to be near the statutory
maximum anyway. Even if some increase were obtained, it could be more than
offset by the expense of hiring an expert.

Pa. 308, 18 A. 330 (1889). See also Page, "Pecuniary" Damages for Wrongful
Death, 1963 TRIAL LAW. GuIDE 398; 22 AM. JUR.2d Death § 248 (1965); 25A
C.J.S. Death § 103 (1966).
21. Sapra note 20.
22. Id. at 180, 133 N.E.2d at 296.
23. 350 Mo. 1143, 169 S.W.2d 947 (1943). See also: Bryan v. East St. Louis
Ry., 39 S.W.2d 376 (St. L. Mo. App. 1931) (applying Illinois law); Baldwin v.
Kansas City Ry., 231 S.W. 280 (K.C. Mo. App. 1921); Martin v. St. Louis-S. F.
Ry., 227 S.W. 129 (St. L. Mo. App. 1921), rev'd on other grounds, 289 Mo. 479,
233 S.W. 219 (1921); Samohoviec v. American Mfg. Co., 218 S.W. 684 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1920); Note, 1963 Wash. U.L.Q. 125.
24. Supra note 23, at 1156, 169 S.W.2d at 954.
25. 104 Mich. 582, 62 N.W. 993 (1895).
26. Crook v. Eckhardt, 281 Mich. 703, 275 N.W. 739 (1937).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/8
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b. Amounts Actually Paid.
If, after the death of the wife, the husband has employed persons to .perform
her, tasks, this . amount may be proved and recovered, if reasonable.27 -As a
practical matter,, this will tend to provide a relatively low recovery. There are
additional elements for which compensation may be had, and, in a great many
families the budget will not permit the hiring of adequate replacements. Many
jobs may be left undone and friends and relatives may provide care for the children at times when the father is unavailable to do so. As will be seen, most
courts will not consider the subsequent remarriage or engagement of the husband,
but if amounts actually paid were the sole measure of damages, damages would
cease on remarriage. The husband would not have to hire anyone to perform
such services after his remarriage.
Proof of this type will serve the purpose of providing a floor figure for recovery and will be at least some indication of what services of this type will cost
in the community. Care should be taken, however, in relying too heavily on this
because the defendant may desire to use the amounts already paid to show what
services will be required when actually the person hired may not adequately fill
the job or possess the required qualifications.
c. Testimony of Family and Friends
As stated above, it is advisable to have testimony of family and friends to
show what services were actually performed. Because of this intimate knowledge
of the activities of the wife, some courts have allowed these same people, including
the husband, to testify as to the value of her services 28 In Burke v. City and County
of San Francsco,20 testimony of the husband estimating that it would cost $225
to $250 per month to replace his wife was admitted and said not to violate
the opinion rule on the theory that nobody would be better qualified than the
man who has been living with the person who must be replaced.
In Combs v. Combs,30 the Missouri court allowed the wife of the defendant,
who had known the decedent eighteen months, to testify as to the value of her
services.
It is submitted that the cases permitting such testimony are based on the
superior knowledge of the witness as to the services performed and not on any
superior knowledge of the cost of replacing such services. On this basis, it would be
preferable to exclude such testimony unless some actual superior knowledge of the
cost of services in the community can be shown.
27. Herro v. Northwestern Malleable Iron Co., 181 Wis. 198, 194 N.W.383
(1923). Glaser, op. cit. supra note 1; Kierr, supra note 13.
28. Grand Trunk W. Ry. v. Gilpin, 208 F. 126 (7th Cir. 1913); Burke v.
City and County of San Francisco, 111 Cal. App. 2d 314, 244 P.2d 708 (1952);
Olstead v. Fahise, 204 Minn. 118, 282 N.W. 694 (1938); Murphey v. Blankenship,
120 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
29. Supra note 28.
,,
30. 284 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. 1955).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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d. Expert Testimony

If admitted -by the court, expert testimony can be used to establish what
services will have to be replaced and what the cost will be. Only'a few cases
have considered the question of the admissibilty of expert testimony. No case
has considered the question whether there are persons qualified as experts in
this area. Of- the cases considering whether this is a proper subject for expert
32
testimony, all have admitted the testimony.31 In Merill v.United Air Lines, Iro.,
the court said:
Popular knowledge and common sense may be and indeed are valuable. But they are not the sole recourse. The fact that parents 'from time
immemorial have taken care of their children does not establiMh that the
views of a professional home economist may not be sounder than those
of untrained laymen in determining the cost of these elements that go
into the home in order to provide the children with so-called "substitute
mother" care.
As knowledge becomes more professionalized, specialists will more
frequently be called upon as expert witnesses. This is a judicial by-product
of an age of pervasive technology and expanding social sciences. 33
Several of the legal writers in this area recommend use of expert testimony, and
none question its admissibility. 4
Missouri has no case involving either expert testimony as to the value of
services or what services will have to be replaced in any type of wrongful
-death

31. Har-Pen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967);
Curnow v. West View Park Co., 220 F. Supp. 367 (W.D. Pa. 1963), rev'd on other
grounds, 337 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1964); Legare v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 557
(D. Fla. 1961); Merill v. United Air Lines, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. N.Y.
1959); Atlantic Coastline Ry. v. Braz, 182 So.2d 491 (Fla. 1966), modified, 196
So.2d 109 (Fla. 1967), vacated, 196 So.2d 449 (Fla. 1967); Smith v. Whidden, 87
So.2d 42 (Fla. 1956); Lithgow v. Hamilton, 69 So.2d 776 (Fla. 1954); Zaninovich
v. American Airlines, Inc., 47 Misc.2d 584, 262 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1965), modified, 26
A.D. 2d 155, 271 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1966); Weiss v. Rubin, 11 App. Div.2d 818,
205 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1960), aff'd, 213 N.Y.S.2d 65, 173 N.E.2d 791 (1960). In
Connie's Prescription Shop v. McCann, 316 P.2d 823 (Okla. 1957) the court held
the value of services to be within the common knowledge of the jury as discussed
above but then said "expert testimony would not necessarily be any more accurate or stable than the personal opinions of individual jurors." Id. at 825. It is
not clear from this language whether the Oklahoma court would exclude the use
of expert testimony if the question were squarely presented to them.
32. Supra note 31.
33. Id.at 705.
34. 13 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 193, 200 (1963); "No difficulty should be
encountered in establishing the need for expert testimony or in qualifying the
witness as an expert, for although the services under decision are within the
common knowledge of every juror, the current economic value of these services is
a matter of expert proof." See also Berman, Expert Testimony as to the Value
of Services of Deceased Mother and Housewife, in 1959 TRIALi Am TORT TRms
238 (Belli ed.); SPEISER, op. cit. supra note 1; Eden, The Use of Economists and
Statisticians in Impaired Earning Capacity Cases, March 1964 THE PRACTICAL
LAwYER 23; Note, 25 NACCA L.J. 186 (1960); 16 AM. Jtm. PROOF OF FACTs 701,

705 (1965).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/8
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case. The Missouri cases, in general, have been' fairly restrictive concerning
whether expert testimony is available in a particular area. The usual rule is stated
in the recent case of Houseman v. Fiddyment:3 5

When the jurors, for want of experience or knowledge of the subject
under inquiry are incapable of reaching an intelligent opinion without outside aid the courts out of necessity admit the testimony of an expert in
the field. Allowing an expert to give an opinion upon a subject of inquiry,
is an 6xception to
instead of requiring that the witness give only 8facts,
6
the general rule that witnesses must state facts.

In the Houseman case, the court refused to allow a nationally recognized
expert to testify as to the point of impact in an automobile collision, although experts
have been allowed to testify as to speed determined from skid marks 37 The
distinction made is whether this subject is within the common knowledge of the
jury. In cases involving the cost of replacement of a wife, the same general
principal would probably be followed. While not directly in point, Missouri does
have some case law on the question of admissibility of expert testimony on the
question of value of services. In Ryan v. Hospes,38 plaintiff served as a nurse for
deceased for several years on the promise of being provided for in the will.
When he died, no provision was made. The court allowed a man trained in hiring
physicians and nurses for other elderly people to testify as to the value of such
services. In the same case a professional nurse was also permitted to testify as
to the cost of hiring a nurse. Other Missouri cases have approved the use of
testimony of attorneys8 9 and real estate agents4" to value the services of others
of the same profession.
Even if the Missouri courts would not directly approve the use of an expert
in this type of case, the rule that "admission of expert testimony in a given
situation rests in the first instance in the sound discretion of the trial court, and
its decision in those respects is not to be set aside in the absence of showing an
abuse of discretion" 41 has received strong support. Under this rule, if there was any
serious doubt as to whether this was common knowledge, the testimony would
come in.

35. 421 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
36. Id. at 289.

37. Edwards v. Rudowicz, 368 S.W.2d 503 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963); Dillenschneider v. Campbell, 350 S.W.2d 260 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961).
38. 167 Mo. 342, 67 S.W. 785 (1902).
39. State ex. rel. First Nat. Bank of Fresno, Cal. v. Flarsheim, 137 Mo. App.
1, 119 S.W. 17 (K.C. Ct. App. 1909).
40. Glover v. Henderson, 120 Mo. 367, 25 S.W. 175 (1894). For another
case expressing a similar view see Beebe v. Columbia Axle Co., 233 Mo. App. 212,
117 S.W.2d 624 (K.C. Ct. App. 1938).
41. Yocum v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 349 S.W.2d 860, 864 (Mo. 1961).
See also, e.g. Capra v. Phillips Inv. Co., 302 S.W.2d (Mo. En Banc 1957); Eickmann v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 651, 253 S.W.2d 122 (1952); Fair
Mercantile Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 237 Mo. App. 511, 175 S.W.2d
930 (St. L. Ct. App. 1943).
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The cases dealing with the use of an expert have approved the testimony of
experts in the following categories: (1) an employment specialist, usually the
manager or an employee of a private or government employment agency; 42 (2) a
professional home economist or other person trained in economics; 43 (3) a family
relations expert, including managers and employees of community service, welfare
44
and philanthropic organizations.
In allowing the use of experts, two distinct methods have been suggested
to illustrate the loss to the surviving husband.
The first is the so-called "substitute mother" approach. The theory is that
recovery should be based on what it would cost to replace the deceased wife
with a person or persons of equal ability and qualifications. 45 Although previous
testimony would have shown what the wife did in the home, it will usually be in
very general terms such as "she did all the housework." To break this down a
professional home economist could be used to show exactly what services go
into "housework" and the manner in which they will have to be replaced. 46 The
economist may or may not be familiar enough with wages and employment practices in the area to qualify as an employment expert. If not, an employment
expert would be used. If it is assumed that the wife performed all the household
duties including care of the children, this expert will indicate that at least two
persons will be required to provide the most essential services. One will be a
live-in governess who may also perform light housekeeping duties.47 To fill this
position adequately, the governess will have to be as similar as possible to the
deceased wife in all respects; which will include age, race, religion, education and
economic background. 48 The employment expert can also indicate the availability
of such persons and what it will cost to hire them. If the wife was young or had
some particular skill needed in the home, it may be difficult to find someone with
these qualifications. The cost will be increased if the children are young or if there
are several.
42. Atlantic Coastline Ry. v. Braz, 182 So.2d 491 (Fla. 1966), nodified, 196
So.2d 109 (Fla. 1967), vacated, 196 So.2d 449 (Fla. 1967); Smith v. Whidden, 87
So.2d 42 (Fla. 1956); Lithgow v. Hamilton, 69 So.2d 776 (Fla. 1954). See also
SPEISER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 199; Spence, Demonstrative Evidence, in WRONGFUL DEATH AND SURVIVORSHIP 109 (Beall ed. 1958); Kierr, supra note 13; 16
AM. JUR. PROOF OF FAcs 701 (1965); 13 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 193 (1963).
43. Har-Pen Trucklines, Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1967); Merill
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. N.Y. 1959); SPEISER, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 293; 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FAcTs 701 (1965).
44. Curnow v. West View Park Co.. 220 F. Supp. 367 (W.D. Pa. 1963),
rev'd on other grounds, 337 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1964); Horton v. State, 50 Misc.2d
1017, 372 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1966); Berman, op. cit. supra note 42; SPEISER, op. cit.
supra note 1 at 302; Kierr, supra note 13; Lambert, supra note 1; 13 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FAcTs 193 (1963).
45. Spangenberg, op. cit. squpra note 13; SPEISER, op. cit. supra note 1; Lambert,
swpra note 1; Kierr, supra note 13; 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FAcTs 701, 714 (1965).
46. SPEISER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 292.
47. Lassiter, Estimating the Monetary Value of Damages in Negligence Cases
Involving Death, in DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH CASES
463 (Schreiber ed. 1965); SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 306 (1966).
48. Spangenberg, op. cit. supra note 13, at 72; SPEISER, op. cit. su'pra, note 47,
at 199, 306.
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The other person will perform the heavier housekeeping and .cooking, but
because, of lesser contact with the family and the type of work being done, her
qualifications need not be so high. 49
"In addition to the basic personnel requirements, additional replacement help
must be made.available to provide permanent employees with time off, vacations
and sick leave. Adequate allowance for such replacement help must be made to
minimize the turnover of basic employees." 50 This usually means two days off
each week, two weeks vacation and two weeks sick leave each year.
These two basic employees plus replacement help will have to be supplemented by hourly workers for special services such as interior decorating, gardening, etc., which the wife may have performed. 5'
As to all employees, the cost should include taxes, workmen's compensation
and the cost of any meals or housing provided. 52 With employees of this type
there will be a fairly rapid turnover so some allowance should also be made for
the cost of finding replacements.
The total when computed by this method has varied widely, but it is not
53
unrealistic to suppose that the present total would be $6,000 to $8,000 per year.
When the children are grown, the amount of services required will be greatly
decreased. The primary need then will be for someone like the housekeeper. No
live-in help would necessarily be required.5 4
49. Lassiter, op. cit. supra note 47.
50. Id. at 464. See also Kierr, supra note 13, at 210.
51. Spangenberg, op. cit. supra,note 13; SPEISER, op. cit. supra note 47; at 199.
52. Kierr, supra note 13, at 220.
53. In Legare v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 557 (D. Fla. 1961), the expert
testimony was that it would cost 58,500 per year to replace the wife. Similarly
in Lithgow v. Hamilton, 69 So.2d 176 (Fla. 1954) a $100,000 judgment was affirmed
on testimony by an expert that a person would have to be employed that would
be a combination of governess, counsellor and housekeeper at a rate of $250 per
month ($3,000 per year) plus one day off each week. In addition, someone would
be needed three days a week at $10 per day plus carfare and meals to do the
laundry and heavy housecleaning. In Horton v. State, 50 Misc.2d 1017, 1027, 272
N.Y.S.2d 312, 323 (1966), the expert testified that "the family would require a
homemaker to act as substitute mother and the minimum fair and reasonable cost
would be $84.00 per week until Barbara became 20 years of age. In addition, a
domestic would be required for at least four hours a day at $1.25 per hour for
the balance of Robert Horton's life, or for 20.45 years. These estimates do not
include the cost of meals, social security compensation and unemployment insurance, substitute domestic service during vacations or transportation costs.
"These are bread and butter figures. The services rendered by a domestic and
homemaker fall far short of the true pecuniary loss of a wife and mother."
A $67,000 judgment was affirmed in Connie's Prescription Shop v. McCann,
316 P.2d 823, 824 (Okla. 1957) where the daughter had a skin condition for which
special treatment was required and which the mother had provided. The court found
that "the cost of a housekeeper who would also discharge these additional duties
toward the child would have been a minimum of $300 monthly plus room and
board."
See also Kierr, supra note 13, who estimates the average yearly replacement
value to be $3,090.36. Lassiter, supra note 47, at 464 calculated the cost of a
governess as $5236 per year and $2336 for domestic help.
54. Lassiter, supra note 47, at 463.
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The. second, approach involves a very complex process. All the services performed are broken down into the greatest possible detail, the number of hours per
week spent at each activity is determined and this is multiplied by the prevailing
hourly rate for that kind of job in the community. An example of this approach
is found in The American Home.55 The work of the housewife was broken down
into: cook, dishwasher, dietician, baker, waitress, private nurse, baby sitter,
governess, chambermaid, purchasing agent, veterinarian, laundress, home economist,
dressmaker, handyman, hostess, general housekeeper, secretary, gardener, chauffeur
and recreation worker. Based on this analysis, the author arrived at a total of
$193.95 per week. In another application of this approach, the author reached a
total of $145.99 per week based on a 106 hour week at fifteen different occupations. 56
This method may set the highest possible recovery if used properly. No case
has fully discussed and approved the use of this method, but in Har-Pen Truck
Lines, Irnc. v. Mials,57 the expert, a professor of economics, used the concept of
"utility producing power" which involved determining the market rate for each
service she was performing. It has been suggested that:
In the future a more precise measure based on a job analysis of the work
she actually performs in her home may be utilized. This in turn might be
translated into standard work units. Home economists are already assigning local wage rates to the various types of home tasks for which standard
work units have been developed in order to establish the minimum value
of the homemaker's contribution in performing these tasks. Meal preparation, for example, usually commands a higher rate of pay than weekly
cleaning and laundry. Estimating the money value of work done in the
home, thus, may in the future be scientifically standardized. 58
D. Intangibles in Addition to the Cost of a Mere Housekeeper
If either of the approaches described above are taken, recovery will be
based on a theory of cost of replacement. It is obvious that to replace a wife
and mother adequately is an impossibility. In recognition of this fact there have
been many cases allowing additional compensations over replacement cost. This
element is to be distinguished from loss of comfort and society or loss of consortium which is discussed in the following section. The loss that is being considered
here is composed of those unique qualities of an individual which another hired as
a replacement will not possess. An example is the value of the advice of the wife
in running the home and raising the children.
In Fabrizi v. Griffln,59 the wife and mother was killed in an automobile-truck
collision. In holding the verdict not to be excessive, the court said:
55. "Man's Best Investment-His Wife," Jan. 1959, THE AMERICAN HOME
34.
56. Spence, op. cit. supra note 42, at 118.
57. 378 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967).
58. 16 Am. JuR. PROOF OF FAcTs 701, 857 (1965).
59. 162 F. Supp. 276 (W.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 261 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1958).
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Certainly the service of a wife is pecuniarily more valuable than that
of a mere hireling. The frugality, industry, usefulness, attention and tender
solicitude of a wife surely make her services greater than those of an ordinary servant and therefore worth more. These elements are not to be excluded from the consideration of a jury in making a mere money estimate
of value. 60
Similarly, in Continental Bus System v. Toombs, 61 the court stated:
Rather would there be included along with recovery of the value of
her services such counseling, advising, inspiring, comforting and otherwise
serving her husband as would reasonably have been expected from a wife
2
who was the kind of person she is shown to have been
This theory has been applied in several states, including some which have
63
refused to grant relief for loss of comfort and society.
Missouri has not considered the question, but there are many cases indicating
that the jury has very wide discretion in assessing damages for every pecuniary
loss. 0 4 A loss to be classified as pecuniary does not have to be one which can
be replaced by hiring someone else or otherwise spending money. From this broad
language, and from Missouri's position on the loss of comfort and society, recovery
for this element probably would be allowed.
E. Loss of Comfort and Society
If a wife is injured the husband may recover damages for loss of consortium
or loss of comfort and society, but if she dies from her injuries, the courts are
split. A total of twenty-two jurisdictions, by statute or judicial decision, have
permitted or denied recovery with regard to the death of a wife.
At least seven states have express statutory language permitting recovery
either as a part of the pecuniary injury or as a separate measure of damages.
60. 'Id. at 278. For identical language see The Pa. R.R. v. Goodman, 62 Pa.
329, 339 (1869).
61. 325 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
62. Id. at 167.
63. Brest v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 216 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1954); Chase v.
Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461, 45 A.2d 789 (1946); Pollard v. Kent, 59 Ga. App. 118,
200 S.E. 542 (1938); Blue's Truckline, Inc. v. Harwell, 194 S.E. 399, 57 Ga. App.
136 (1937), rev'd on other grounds, 199 S.E. 739, 187 Ga. 78 (1938); Horton v.
State, 50 Misc.2d 1017, 272 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1966); Prauss v. Adamski, 195 Or. 1,
244 P.2d 598 (1952); Spangler v. Helm's New York-Pittsburgh Motor Express,
396 Pa. 482, 153 A.2d 490 (1959); Gaydos v. Domabyl, 301 Pa. 523, 152 A. 549

(1930).
64. E.g. Steger v. Meehan, 63 S.W.2d 109, 115 (Mo. 1933), stating: "apparently the legislative intent as expressed in the . . . statutes . . . is to give the
jury broad discretion in computing damages in actions for wrongful death, within
the limit prescribed, based upon the pecuniary loss of every kind and character
which, under all the circumstances of the particular case, will be sustained by those
entitled to recover as a direct result of the death, and based upon circumstances
in mitigation or aggravation of the wrongful act, neglect or default which caused
it, and that this discretion given the jury in computing fair and just damages
should not be interfered with unless it has been abused."
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These include Alaska, 5 Arkansas, 66 Hawaii,6 7 Kansas,0 8 Nevada,69 Wisconsin,7 0
and Wyoming.71 No state has a statute expressly denying recovery.
Judicial decisions in seven other states have permitted recovery; these include
California,72 Georgia, 73 Indiana, 74 , Michigan, 5 Missouri, 76 New York,7 " and Washington.78 The theory on which these cases and statutes are based was explained
by the court in Miller v. Southern Pac. Ry., 70 while construing the California
wrongful death statute:
They are founded upon the theory that the wrongdoer ought not to
be permitted to destroy the home or to take away the support, society
and comfort and care which one enjoys, and of which he has a moral right
to expect the continuance and escape liability to the extent of purely
pecuniary compensation for the wrong on the ground that there are
things, however important they may be to the life and future of the sufferer are too intangible to be cognized by law.80
A similar position has been taken by those writers who have commented
upon it.81

65. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.20.340 (1962).
66. ARK. STAT. § 27-909 (1947).
67. HAwAII REv. LAws § 246-2 (1955).
68. KANSAS GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3203 (1949).
69. NEv. REv. STAT. § 41.100 (1963).
70. Wis. STAT. ANN § 331.04 (1958).
71. Wyo. STAT. ANN § 1-1066 (1957).
72. Burke v. City and County of San Francisco, 111 Cal. App.2d 314, 244
P.2d 708 (1952); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App.2d 308, 59 Cal. Reptr. 463
(1967).
73. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Floyd, 249 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 949 (1958).
74. American Carloading Corp. v. Gary Trust & Savings Bank, 216 Ind. 649,
25 N.E.2d 777 (1940).
75. Stuive v. Pere Marquette Ry., 311 Mich. 143, 18 N.W.2d 404 (1945).
76. In Re Wood's Petition, 145 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1956), aff'd, 245
F.2d 306 (8th Cir. 1957); Simpson v. Simpson, 221 Mo. App. 550, 288 S.W. 69
(K.C. Ct. App. 1926); Martin v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry., 227 S.W. 129 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1921), rev'd on other grounds, 289 Mo. 479, 233 S.W. 219 (En Banc 1921).
See also 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 125, 144.
77. Finkel v. State, 37 Misc.2d 757, 237 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1962). The New York
decisions are not clear. The court in this case made the following statement: "In
the case of a wife and mother we are not unmindful that while not awarding
damages for sentiment and emotion, a mother's care, guidance and control with
respect to the members of her family is something for the loss of which the family
suffers pecuniarily." Id. at 761, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 70. This language could be construed as only allowing something in addition to the cost of a mere housekeeper,
but it could also be construed to mean "comfort and society."
78. Kramer v. Portland-Seattle Auto Freight, 43 Wash.2d 386, 261 P.2d 692

(1953).
79. 266 Mo.19, 178 S.W. 885 (1915).
80. Id. at 47, 178 S.W. at 893.
81. SPEIsER, op. cit. supra note 47, at 218; Kierr, Proof of Damages Arising
from the Death of a Housewife, 8 LA. B.J. 215 (1961); Page, "Pecuniary" Damages
for Wrongful Death, 1963 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 398.
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It would, seem that all wrongful death actions, since they are atlunder the
same statute, would be dealt with in the same manner. Missouri, however, has
taken a rather unique position. If the wife is suing for the death of the husland82
or a child is suing for the death of a parent s 3 or a parent is suing for-the death
of a child,8 4 there may be no recovery for the loss of the comfort -and society of
the deceased person. However, if the husband is suing for the death of the wife,
damages may be recovered for loss of comfort and society.85 This is illustrated
by the following statement from In Re Wood's Petition86 that he may recover
not only for the pecuniary loss but also for loss of companionship and
other elements incidental to the marriage relationship, but this does not
apply to a son or daughter, and the measure of damages in the latter case
must be measured by the actual
pecuniary or monetary loss which has
87
been sustained by the parent.
On the other hand, eight other jurisdictions; Iowa,88 Maryland,8 9 New Jersey,90
North Dakota,91 Pennsylvania,9 2 Tennessee, 93 Texas,9 4 and the federal courts
under the Federal Tort Claims Act,9 5 have decided that the loss of comfort and
society was not includible as an element of damages.
One basis for this view is shown by McGown v. International & G. N. Ry. 98

where the court said:
82. Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Wilson, 48 F. 57 (8th Cir. 1891); Truesdale
v. Wheelock, 335 Mo. 924, 74 S.W.2d 585 (1934); Miller v. Kansas City Ry., 233
S.W. 1066 (Mo. 1921); Schaub v. Hannibal & St. J. Ry., 106 Mo. 74; 16 S.W.
924 (1891); Haines v. Pearson, 107 Mo. App. 481, 81 S.W. 645 (K.C. Ct. App.
1904); Knight v. The Sadtler Lead & Zinc Co., 75 Mo. App. 541 (K.C. Ct. App.
1898).
83. Caen v. Feld, 371 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. 1963); Patison v. Campbell, 337
S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1960).
84. Acton v. Shields, 386 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1965); Bolino v. Illinois Terminal
Ry., 355 Mo. 1236, 200 S.W.2d, 352 (1947); Oliver v. Morgan, 73 S.W.2d 993
(Mo. 1934); Leahy v. Davis, 121 Mo. 227, 25 S.W. 941 (1894); Szofran v. Century Elec. Co., 255 S.W.2d 443 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953); Pyle v. City of Columbia,
263 S.W. 474 (K.C. Ct. App. 1923); Howard v. Scarritt Estate Co., 161 Mo.
App. 552, 144 S.W. 185 (K.C. Ct. App. 1912); Dando v. Home Tel. Co., 126 Mo.
App. 242, 103 S.W. 103 (St. L. Ct. App. 1907); Marshall v. Consolidated Jack
Mines Co., 119 Mo. App. 270, 95 S.W. 972 (K.C. Ct. App. 1906).
85. See cases cited note 76 supra.
86. 145 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
87. Id. at 859.
88. Kilmer v. Gustason, 211 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1954).
89. State of Md. ex rel. Ungolo v. Miller, 210 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Pa. 1962)
(Applying Md. law).
90. Carter v. West Jersey & S. Ry., 76 N.J.L. 602, 71 A. 253 (1908).
91. Larson v. Meyer, 135 N.W.2d 145 (N.D. 1965).
92. Byrne v. Matczak, 254 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1958); The Pa. R.R. v. Goodman, 62 Pa. 329 (1869).
93. Knight v. Nurseryman Supply, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Tenn. 1965);
Phillips Buttorft Mfg. Co. v. McAlexander, 15 Tenn. App. 618 (1932).
94. Simpson v. Barham, 292 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); McGown
v. International & G. N. Ry., 85 Tex. 289, 20 S.W. 80 (1892).
95. Hoyt v. United States, 286 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1961).
96. 85 Tex. 289, 20 S.W. 80 (1892).
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The idea of damages as solatiunm or for sentimental reasons, such
as one caused by grief or loss of society is excluded..The damages contemplated are purely pecuniary and compensatory. They rest upon considerations such as the value of the services or advantage in money, reasofiably to be expected by the survivor if the deceased had lived.97
Thus, the court says this element does not come within the pecuniary loss standard. Additional bases for this rule have been that damages, although within the
pecuniary standard, are too speculative for determination or that the jury will
not have adequate standards on which to base a judgment and may be unduly
influenced by this factor.
The reasoning of these courts denying recovery is questionable. What these
courts have consistently failed to explain is why, when the wife is only injured,
loss of consortium (including loss of comfort and society) is an element of damages in a suit by the husband, while it is refused if the wife dies. Prior to the
enactment of Lord Campbell's Act in 1847, the distinction between injury and
death was greater. No recovery could be had by the survivor on any theory if
the victim died. By denying recovery for the loss of comfort and society, these
cases have carried this archaic distinction over into the modem law. The absurdity of this position becomes apparent in the situation where the wife is so
injured that she sinks into a deep coma for many years before death. Compare
this with the situation where she is killed instantly. The loss to the husband is as
great in either, but under the rule adopted by these courts, recovery for loss of
comfort and society would be allowed in the former, but not the latter. In response to those cases that contend that such damages are too intangible and
speculative, it should be sufficient to point out that this does not bar recovery
when the wife is merely injured.
F. Computation of the JTdgment
1. Life Expectancy
Obviously, the size of the judgment will vary considerably with the number
of years over which it is computed. In a personal injury case, the life expectancy
of the injured person will be of primary importance. In a wrongful death case,
however, it is the pecuniary or other injury to the statutory beneficiary which
supplies the measure of damages. The beneficiary could not expect these services
for a period longer than his own life or the life of the spouse. Therefore, the general
rule is that the joint life expectancy will have to be used to determine the period
for which damages are to be computed. This could be a significant factor where
the husband is suing because he is often slightly older. Even at the same age the
expectancy of the wife will be somewhat greater.
The general rule is stated in Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Crudup:98 "In all cases
of this character it must be the expectation of that one who would soonest dies
97. Id. at 293, 20 S.W. at 81.
98. 63 Miss. 291 (1885).
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which would control."9 9 Similar language can be found in most jurisdictions,10 0
including Missouri.' 01 However, in the old Pennsylvania case of Emery v. City of
Philadelphia,02 a contrary position was taken:
The life of the husband has been terminated by the accident,' its
probable duration in the regular course of nature must, as already said,
be approximated by the best evidence attainable, even though that leads
only to conjecture. But the widow, plaintiff, is living, and is entitled now
to compensation for what she has lost by her husband's death. To complicate the question by another conjecture as to her expectation of survivorship would add further uncertainty in the result without being so
clearly demanded
by reason or justice as to be imperative or even
103
advisable.
Mortality tables can be used to show the life expectancy of the beneficiary
as well as of the deceased, 10 4 but they are only evidence and the jury is not
bound by them. 105
99. Id. at 303.
100. E.g. Montellier v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. N.Y. 1962),
aff'd, 315 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1963); Valente v. Sierra Ry. of Cal., 151 Cal. 534,
91 Pac. 481 (1907); Smith v. Whidden, 87 So.2d 42 (Fla. 1956); Duval v. Hunt,
34 Fla. 85, 15 So. 876 (1894); Handorf v. Currie, 251 Iowa 896, 101 N.W.2d 836
(1960); In Re Olney's Estate, 309 Mich. 65, 14 N.W.2d 574 (1944); Stuive v.
Pere Marquette Ry., 311 Mich. 143, 18 N.W.2d 404 (1945); Horton v. State,
50 Misc.2d 1017, 272 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1966); Union Transports, Inc. v. Braun, 318
S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
101. Stottle v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 321 Mo. 1190, 18 S.W.2d 433 (1929),
cert. denied, 280 U.S. 589 (1929); McIntyre v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry., 286 Mo. 234, 227
S.W. 1047 (1920), cert. denied, 255 U.S. 573 (1921); Morton v. Southwestern Tel.
& Tel. Co., 280 Mo. 360, 217 S.W. 831 (1920); McCord v. Schaff, 279 Mo. 558,
216 S.W. 320 (1919); Cervillo v. Manhattan Oil Co., 226 Mo. App. 1090, 49
S.W.2d 183 (K.C. Ct. App. 1932); Heath v. Salisbury Home Tel. Co., 27 S.W.2d
31 (K.C. Mo. App. 1927), affd, 326 Mo. 875, 33 S.W.2d 118 (1930); Stevens v.
Kansas City Power and Light Co., 200 Mo. App. 651, 208 S.W. 630 (K.C. Ct. App.
1919); Chambers v. Kupper-Benson Hotel Co., 154 Mo. App. 249, 134 S.W. 45
(K.C. Ct. App. 1911). See however Morrow v. Missouri Gas and Elec. Serv. Co.,
315 Mo. 367, 286 S.W. 106 (1926) where the instructions to the jury did not
consider the life expectancy of the plaintiff but no error was found by the Supreme
Court: "It appears from the evidence that the wife was junior in age and hence
her life expectancy was longer than that of the deceased. Plaintiff's damages were
properly predicated upon the shorter life expectancy of the deceased. The jury had
some visual evidence of the health of the plaintiff for she appeared before them
as a witness at the trial." Id. at 389, 286 S.W. at 116. It is difficult to conceive
how the jury could be expected to take the factor of the joint life expectancy into
account unless told to do so even if they did have some visual experience.
102. 208 Pa. 492, 57 At. 977 (1904).
103. Id. at 499, 57 At. at 979. A similar position was taken in Missouri,
0. & G. Ry. v. Lee, 175 Pac. 367 (Okla. 1918), but the case was overruled in
Whitehead Coal & Mining Co. v. Wintoom, 230 P. 509 (Okla. 1924). Despite this
fact, in Simpson v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry., 334 Mo. 1126, 70 S.W.2d 904 (1934) the
Missouri Supreme Court stated the Oklahoma rule to be as in the 1918 case.
104. E.g. Montellier v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. N.Y. 1962),
aff'd, 315 F.2d 180 (2d Civ. 1963); Jones v. McMillan, 129 Mich. 86, 88 N.W. 206
(1901); McIntyre v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry., 286 Mo. 234, 227 S.W. 104 (1920), cert.
denied, 255 U.S. 573 (1921).
105. E.g. Morton v. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co., 280 Mo. 360, 217 S.W. 831
(1920); Stevens v. Kansas City Power and Light Co., 200 Mo. App. 651, 208 S.W.
630 (K.C. Ct. App. 1919).
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An additional consideration occasionally mentioned is the concept of "work
life expectancy." This takes into account the fact that as one advances in age he
may retire or his productivity will be reduced. In cases of the death of a husband,
it is sometimes applied because of the practice of actual retirement before death.
It is of limited use with respect to a wife because, although there may be some
slowing down, services in the home usually continue to be rendered until a
relatively short time before death. 106 Any difference between actual life expectancy
and work life expectancy in such cases would normally be so small that it need
not be taken into account.
2. Cost of Maintenance
The rule in most jurisdictions is that the amount which decedent
would have required for his own personal use and maintenance or personal living expenses must be deducted in determining the value of his
life . .

.

.In an action by a husband to recover for the wrongful death

of his wife, the cost of suitably maintaining her is107to be deducted from
the amount estimated as the value of her services.
08
The great weight of authority agrees with the above statement of the rule.'
109
Missouri has no case involving the death of a wife, but in Oliver v. Morgan,
the cost of maintenance of a minor son was required to be deducted thereby
indicating that the theory is recognized in Missouri.
Not all states agree. In the Georgia case of Har-Pen Truck Lines, Inc. v.
Mills,110 the court refused to allow the cost of maintenance to be deducted because it construed the statute to be both compensatory and punitive and therefore
not to require it. The plaintiff was allowed to recover the "full value of the life
of the decedent" rather than just any actual pecuniary loss that was suffered.

106. Stuive v. Pere Marquette Ry., 311 Mich. 143, 18 N.W.2d 404 (1945); rin
Re Olney's Estate, 309 Mich. 65, 14 N.W.2d 574 (1944); Lindenfeld v. Michigan
Interstate Truck Co., 274 Mich. 681, 265 N.W. 501 (1936); See also SPEIsER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH

109 (1966).

107. 25A C.J.S. Death § 114 p. 962 (1966).
108. Grand Trunk Western Ry. v. Gilpin, 208 F. 126 (7th Cir. 1913); Curnow
v. West View Park Co., 220 F. Supp. 367 (W.D. Pa. 1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d 241
(3d Cir. 1964); Fabrizi v. Griffin, 162 F. Supp. 276 (W.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 261
F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1958); Stafford v. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555 (W.D.
Pa. 1947), modified, 165 F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1948); Denver & R. G. R.R. v. Gunning,
33 Colo. 280, 80 Pac. 727 (1905); Lithgow v. Hamilton, 69 So.2d 776 (Fla. 1954);
Grimes v. King, 311 Mich. 399, 18 N.W.2d 870 (1945); In Re Olney's Estate, 309
Mich. 65, 14 N.W.2d 574 (1944); Lindenfeld v. Michigan Interstate Truck Co.,
274 Mich. 681, 265 N.W. 501 (1936); Gorton v. Harmon, 152 Mich. 473, 116 N.W.
443 (1908); Baker v. Salvation Army, Inc., 91 N.H. 1, 12 A.2d 514 (1940);
Phillips v. Pickell, 57 Berks 107 (Pa. Com. P1. 1965); Siidekum v. Animal Rescue
League of Pittsburgh, 353 Pa. 408, 45 A.2d 59 (1946); Gaydos v. Domabyl, 301
Pa. 523, 152 A. 549 (1930); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Southwick, 30 S.W. 592 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1895); Mertens v. Lundquist, 15 Wis.2d 540, 113 N.W.2d 149 (1962).
See also 22 Am.JUR.2d Deat § 170 (1965).
109. 54 Mo. 285, 73 S.W.2d 993 (1934).
110. 378 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967).
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Despite the great weight of authority requiring the deduction of the cost of
maintenance, very few courts have made any real attempt to delineate exactly
what elements are to be considered to be Within "maintenance." This is illustrated
by tle following statement from Curnow v. West View Park Co."' which contains
a good discussion of the problem:
While there is no requirement that the evidence as to probable cost
of maintenance be direct and precise, there is a requirement that it be
sufficient to enable the jurors to make a fair determination."12
If properly considered, the cost of maintenance could become a substantial
deduction from the judgment. In many cases, however, this cost can largely be
offset by the cost of room and board of a live-in governess or other domestic help.
Deduction of the cost of maintenance is entirely in keeping with the compensatory
idea of damages, but there should be more of an attempt to outline its components. If this element is to have any real significance, it must be one on which
proof can be presented with some accuracy.
3. Remarriage of Surviving Spouse
If a truly pecuniary loss standard were used, all factors which could affect
the amount of the actual pecuniary loss would have to be taken into account.
The husband will commonly have to hire various persons to perform the services
formerly performed by the wife. Should he remarry, this will no longer be necessary
and it would logically seem that remarriage or the possibility thereof should be
considered.
It is illustrative of the lip service given the pecuniary loss standard to note
that of the few cases considering this question, in a case involving the death of a
wife, the unanimous holding is that remarriage of the 'husband will not be considered in any way in determining damages. 113 Missouri"l4 and several other
states'1 5 have considered cases involving the death of a husband and the remarriage of the wife and have held the remarriage to be irrelevant. Only Wisconsin
111. 337 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1962).
112. Id. at 242.
113. Coleman v. Moore, 108 F. Supp. 425 (D.D.C. 1952); Lees v. New York
Consol. Ry., 109 Misc. Rep. 608, 180 N.Y.S. 546 (1919); Davis v. Guarnieri, 45
Ohio St. 470, 15 N.E. 350 (1887); Prauss v. Adamski, 195 Or. 1 244 P.2d 598
(1952); International & G. N. Ry. v. Boykin, 85 S.W. 163 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905),
rev'd on other grounds, 99 Tex. 259, 89 S.W. 639 (1905); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry., v.
Younger, 90 Tex. 387, 38 S.W. 1121 (1897); Dimmey v. Wheeling & E. G. R.R.,
27 W. Va. 37, 55 Am. Rep. 292 (1885).
114. Katz v. North Kansas City Dev. Co., 223 Mo. App. 606, 14 S.W.2d 701
Ct. App. 1929); Platt v. Cape Girardeau Bell Tel. Co., 12 S.W.2d .933 (St.
-Mo. App. 1929); Davis v. Springfield Hospital, 204 Mo. App. 626, 218 S.W.
696 (Spr. Ct. App. 1920). See also SPEISER, op. cit. supra note 106, at § 6:12; 22
AM. JUR.2D Death § 164 (1965); 25A C.J.S. Death § 114 (1966).
115. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Connor, 261 F.2d 656 (4th Cir: 1958), The
City of Rome, 48 F.2d 333 (S.D. N.Y. 1930); Blumenthal v. United States, 189
F. Supp. 439 (E.D. Pa. 1960); United States v. The S. S. Washington, 172 F.
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now follows a contrary rule, 1
considered,." 7

6

but prior to 1965, Michigan also allowed it to be

The cases supporting the majority do so either on the theory
damages are determined at the time of the decedent's death or that it
too'speculative to consider remarriage because of the comparison that
made between the respective earnings, services and contributions of
spouse with those of the deceased spouse." 8

that the
would be
would be
the new

4. Economic Trends, Taxes and Present Value
Those factors previously discussed are unique to this particular type of case.
As in any case involving future damages, however, several other factors must also
be considered. One of the most important may be the economic trend at the time.
The judgment will, of course, have to be in terms of present day money, but the
economic trend may be considered and the courts have often taken judicial notice
of the decline in the value of the dollar.1" 9
In cases where the loss is based primarily on the loss of future earnings of the
decedent, there is a split of authority as to whether possible future income taxes

Supp. 905 (E.D. Va. 1959), aff'd, 272 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1959); Jones v. Baltimore
& 0. R.R., 143 F. Supp. 15 (W.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd, 239 F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1957);
St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Cleeve, 76 Ark. 377, 88 S.W. 995 (1905); Wood v.
Alves Serv. Transp. Co. 191 Cal. App.2d 723, 13 Cal. Reptr. 114 (1961); Gallo v.
Southern Pac. Co., 43 Cal. App.2d 339, 110 P.2d 1062 (1941); Reynolds v. Willis,
209 A.2d 760 (Del. 1965); Georgia R.R. and Banking Co. v. Garr, 57 Ga. 277, 24
Am. Rep. 492 (1876); Chicago & E. I. R.R. v. Driscoll, 207 Ill. 9, 69 N.E. 620
(1903); 0. S. Richardson Fueling Co. v. Peters, 82 Ill. App. 508 (1898); Wabash
R.R. v. Gretzinger, 182 Ind. 155, 104 N.E. 69 (1910); Consolidated Stone Co. v.
Morgan, 160 Ind. 241, 66 N.E. 696 (1903); Arder v. Bowling, 166 Ky. 139, 179
S.W. 15 (1915); McFarland v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 241 La. 15, 127 So.2d 183
(1961); Stephens v. Natchitoches Parish School Bd., 110 So.2d 156 (La: App.
1959), rev'd on other grounds, 238 La. 388, 115 So.2d 793 (1959); Bunda v.
Hardwick, 376 Mich. 640, 138 N.W.2d 305 (1965); Murphy v. Barlow Realty Co.,
175 Pa. 570, 34 A. 856 (1896); Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Shivers, 131 S.W.2d
677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Moser, 277 S.W. 772 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925), rev'd on other grounds, 275 U.S. 133 (1927).
116. Jensen v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 23 Wis.2d 344, 127 N.W.2d 228 (1964)
on the theory that damages are to be determined as matters stand at the time of
trial. When plaintiff had remarried before trial this could be considered. The 'Wisconsin court specifically rejected the theory that damages are to be determined
from facts as they existed at the date of death.
117. Stuive v. Pere Marquette Ry. 311 Mich. 143, 18 N.W.2d 404 (1945);
Lindenfeld v. Michigan Interstate Truck Co., 274 Mich. 681, 265 N.W.501 (1936);
Sipes v. Michigan C. Ry., 231 Mich. 404, 204 N.W. 84 (1925).
118. See Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 252 (1963).
119. E.g. Fabrizi v. Griffin, 162 F. Supp. 276 (W.D. Pa. 1958), aft'd, 261- F.2d
594 (3d Cir. 1958); Burke v. City and County of San Francisco, 111 Cal. App.2d 314,
244 P.2d 708 (1952); Holley v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 356 Mo. 390, 201 S.W.2d
941 (1947); Horton v. State, 50 Misc.2d 1017, 272 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1966); Zaninovich v. American Airlines, Inc., 262 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1965); Sutfin v. Burton, 91
Ohio App. 177, 104 N.E.2d 598 (1952); Connie's Prescription Shop v. McCann,
316 P.2d 823 (Okla. 1957); Spangler v. Helm's New York-Pittsburgh Motor
Express, 396 Pa. 482, 153 A.2d 490 (1959).
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on those earnings would have to be taken into account. The majority would refuse
to consider future income taxes, usually on the ground that the computation is too
speculative. 120 There is some support for the minority view.1 21
In the usual case involving the wife, the damages will be based on loss of
future services on which there is no possibility of tax, rather than future earnings
and there is no possibility of the question of future taxes being taken into, account
As in any case in which future damages are involved, the judgment must be
discounted to present value. 122 As stated in Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Kelfy,12 3 "It
is self-evident that a given sum of money in hand is worth more than the like
sum in the future." 2 4 Due to the complicated nature of the computation required, courts have generally allowed the use of an actuary or mathematician as
an expert witness. 125 There is a split of authority as to whether the actual figures
involved in the case or neutral figures must be used. 2 6
IV. CONCLUSION

The attorney suing for the wrongful death of a wife and mother will be faced
with numerous problems of judgment and technique, but by the use of those
methods discussed in this article, more rapid change can be expected in this area
in the next few years. Missouri has taken a big step forward in raising the limitation from $25,000 to $50,000. Any further development will depend on the courts
and attorneys.
JAMES T. NEwsoM

120. E.g. N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Delich, 252 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1958); Allendorf
v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 8 Ill.2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288 (1956); Dempsey v. Thompson,
363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952) (Note, however, that this case would require an
instruction that the amount received would not be taxable); Hilton v. Thompson,
360 Mo. 177, 227 S.W.2d 675 (1950). See also SPEISER, Op. Cit. sunra note 106, at
529; Spangenberg, "Proof of Damages for Wrongfad Death," in WRONGFUL DEATH
AND SuRvIvoRsHIP 89 (Beall ed. 1958); 63 A.L.R.2d 1394 (1959).
121. E.g. Floyd v. Fruit Industries, Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957).
See also, HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs 1326 (1956).
122. E.g. Montellier v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. N.Y. 1962),
aff'd, 315 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1953); Heppner v. Atchinson, T. &S. F. Ry., 297 S.W.2d
497 (Mo. 1956), Sieberell v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry., 320 Mo. 916, 9 S.W.2d 912 (1928).
123. 241 U.S. 485 (1916).
124. Id. at 489.
125. Few cases have dealt with the question of whether the testimony of such
an expert is admissible. Most apparently have assumed its admissibility. E.g. Pennell v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 13 111. App.2d 433, 142 N.E.2d 497 (1957). The problem involved in most cases is the proper scope of examination and the proper bases
for computation. See Leasure, How to Prove Reduction to Present Worth, 21 Ohio
St. L. J. 204 (1960); 79 A.L.R.2d 259 (1961).
126. E.g. Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 8 Ill.2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288 (1956)
(the court held that although neutral figures were not used that they should have
been. Missouri may take the opposite view: Heppner v. Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry.,
297 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. 1956).
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